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PERFECTIONIST POLICIES IN FAMILY
LAW
Brian H. Bix*
Linda McClain's book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capac-
ity, Equality, and Responsibility, offers a thoughtful approach to
government policy in family matters, grounded on what McClain
calls "toleration as respect," in which the government has a role in
improving individuals and social institutions, while valuing personal
and collective self-government and making a range of choices avail-
able. McClain's approach combines elements of liberalism, femi-
nism, and civic republicanism.
In the context of considering McClain's proposals regarding
marital equality, same-sex marriage, abortion, and sex education, this
review essay considers the problem of persuasion and social reform.
In a country where many voters and officials do not share the values
and proposals McClain endorses, how would one go about effecting
the reforms she wants? This review essay, using examples from sex
education and same-sex marriage, considers the possibilities, and lim-
its, associated with finding points of agreement, or seeking the com-
mon ground of consequentialism.
The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility,
by Linda C. McClain. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press,
2005. pp. 364. $45.00.
Linda McClain's The Place of Families' is a paradigm of what family
law scholarship should look like: thoughtful, balanced, open-minded, and
grounded in a thorough knowledge of policy, empirical scholarship, and
theoretical argument. At the same time, this book does not shy away
from controversial topics. In fact, it is hard to come up with any divisive
family-related topic that is not covered-topics discussed at length in-
* Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota. I am
grateful for the comments of Linda McClain and other conference participants at a discussion of The
Place of Families at the 12th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law in Salt
Lake City, July 2005.
1. LINDA A. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND
RESPONSIBILITY (2006).
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clude same-sex marriage, proposals to end civil marriage, federal mar-
riage-promotion programs, welfare reform, abortion, and sex education.
There is not enough space here to discuss all these topics in appro-
priate detail, but what follows will sample from the issues McClain dis-
cusses. Part I considers the prescriptive tone of McClain's book and its
connection with civic republicanism and perfectionism. Part II looks at
its discussion of marital equality. Part III analyzes some aspects of the
book's view on abortion. Part IV summarizes McClain's view on the
marriage debates. Finally, Part V returns to the problems of consequen-
tialism and law reform.
The review finds little to disagree with in the book substantively,
but notes possible problems that would occur if and when efforts are
made to reform law and practice to follow the book's prescriptions.
I. PRESCRIPTION, POLICY, AND PERFECTIONISM
The Place of Families is primarily about government programs: ones
that are currently underway, and are or are not working; others that have
been proposed and are or are not good ideas; and ones that are not cur-
rently under serious consideration, but perhaps should be. This is not a
work about theory (family law theory, feminist theory, or otherwise)-
though the author does not hesitate to bring in theory and theorists in
the course of discussing or justifying possible courses of action.
On the relationship between government, law, society, and the indi-
vidual, McClain is a civic republican,2 arguing that the state has a role in
making individual citizens and social institutions better. She writes:
"Government, I contend, has an important responsibility to carry out a
formative project of fostering persons' capacities for democratic and per-
sonal self-government."3 The themes of the book are summarized as fol-
lows: "I propose a framework based on three salient ideas for thinking
about the place of families: fostering capacity, fostering equality, and fos-
tering responsibility."4  At the same time, both here5 and elsewhere,6
McClain also affirms an affiliation with political liberalism.
2. On civic republicanism, see generally J. G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); Francis
Lovett, Republicanism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2006),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/. On McClain's views, see generally Linda C. McClain,
Care as a Public Value, Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1673 (2001); Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civil Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and
Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617 (2001).
3. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 15.
4. Id. at 4.
5. E.g., id. at 17.
6. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Negotiating Gender and (Free and Equal) Citizenship: The Place
of Associations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569, 1569 (2004) ("I consider myself a liberal feminist....").
As the text just quoted indicates, McClain considers herself a liberal and a feminist, as well as a civic
republican, which is an interesting combination given the tendency of some theorists to consider each
a basis for rejecting one or both of the other two. Part of the interest of The Place of Families is the
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The reference to "self-government" 7 is key, as are related refer-
ences to "fostering responsibility."' The government's objective, at least
in the short term, is not to ensure that individuals do the right thing, but
that they make the decisions for themselves and are well placed to do
this competently. According to this view, families have dual roles as both
"a site of private life and institution of public importance because of the
goods they foster and the functions they serve."9
Does the government have a role in making us better people, or at
least better citizens? The question is as old as political thought. The
view that government does have a proper role in improving its citizens,
known as "perfectionism," has supporters across the political spectrum:
from the liberal Joseph Raz" to the cultural conservative Robert
George." There is a strong intuitive or commonsense appeal to this posi-
tion: as James Fitzjames Stephen wrote, "How can the State or the public
be competent to determine any question whatever if it is not competent
to decide that gross vice is a bad thing?"' 2
In contrast to "perfectionism," the tradition of political liberalism is
in part grounded on the view that government should have no such role:
that the government should be "neutral" between individuals' competing
conceptions of the Good and that there is a strong presumption against
State interference with liberty except to prevent harm to third parties. 3
One suspects that some of the people who argue for nonintervention,
noninterference, and neutrality are doing so not because they have a
principled belief in such a stance, but because they distrust the current
government and any government likely to be elected or installed in the
near future.
McClain rejects any such strategic reading of nonintervention and
instead posits "toleration as respect": in certain areas, one must not
merely condone what one concludes to be improper, but rather one must
recognize and respect a range of choices.'" At the same time, however,
government is allowed a role for persuasion-persuasion that falls short
way McClain makes the three perspectives coexist harmoniously within her approach to family mat-
ters.
7. McClain equates "personal self-government" with "autonomy" and defines it as "a person's
capacity to deliberate about his or her conception of the good, including self-determination and per-
sonal decision making with respect to forming. acting on. and revising a conception of a good life."
MCCLAIN. supra note 1. at 17.
8. Id. at 223.
9. Id. at 22.
10. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Liberty and Trust, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM AND MORALITY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 113, 113 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
11. See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (1993).
12. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY. EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 84 (Stephen D. Warner ed.,
Liberty Fund 1993) (1873).
13. The most important source or inspiration for this view is JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
(Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859). though many other theorists, before and
since, have advocated this view. See. e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985).
McClain repeats some of Mill's arguments for noninterference. MCCLAIN, supra note 1. at 30-31.
14. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 29-43.
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of compulsion, thus continuing to respect the individual's self-
government.15 Through the idea of "toleration as respect," McClain is
able to combine a perfectionist view of government with a liberal notion
of broad individual liberties, even if the two views remain in an uneasy
tension.
II. EQUALITY IN MARRIAGE AND GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY
Among the strongest and most persistent themes in the book is the
importance of equality within and among families.16 In regards to equal-
ity within families (equality among families will be discussed in Part IV),
McClain is particularly concerned with how the moral (and constitu-
tional) ideal of sex equality should be supported and reinforced by pub-
lic/governmental standards that will have private repercussions." How-
ever, she would have government stop far short of any sort of imposed
dogma regarding how day-to-day family life is to be led.
The Place of Families responds to a federal government that has, in
recent years (particularly under Republican control, but not only then),
been active in trying to improve individual and social life through regula-
tion of family matters. 8 Although the book agrees in principle with the
idea that the government should be active, it nonetheless disagrees at
numerous points regarding the particular policies and directions that our
government has taken.
McClain accepts a role for marriage and family in shoring up civil
society, but she parts ways with the theorists and policymakers who be-
lieve that it is traditional morality and traditional marriage that would be
best for society. 9 This disagreement connects with one of McClain's
more controversial claims: the government not only should, as a policy
15. Id. at 43-48.
16. "Equality within families" refers to sex equality. E.g., id. at 5. Equality among families in
this book means primarily that the State should-through legal recognition and/or benefits-treat tra-
ditional opposite-sex couple households no better than same-sex couple households, single-parent
households, and the like. E.g., id. at 5-6. However, upon seeing the phrase "equality among families,"
a reader might expect the author to say something about the problem of sharp and increasing resource
inequality among families in the United States-a natural topic, one might have thought, for someone
attuned to questions about how private life might affect the structure and vitality of public life. See,
e.g., Craig Torres & Alexandre Tanzi, Hourglass Economy, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 14, 2006, Business,
at 1 (discussing the growing income and wealth gaps and how they are affecting individuals and fami-
lies). However, the author, perhaps understandably, did not want to take on broad issues of equality
and redistribution, preferring to focus on more specific issues relating to family law.
17. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 147-54.
18. See, e.g., Wade F. Horn, Wedded to Marriage, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.pref=/comment/horn200508090806.asp (defense of
government marriage policy by Assistant Secretary for Children and Families); U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., Admin. for Children & Families, Healthy Marriage Initiative, http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/healthymarriage/index.html (summarizing government marriage promotion program).
19. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 50-84.
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matter, promote sex equality within marriage, but is constitutionally re-
quired to do so."'
McClain argues that if marriage promotion or relationship educa-
tion includes prescriptions of distinct gender roles or gender hierarchy
(as some proposals have suggested), it "would offend the constitutional
principle of sex equality," if only by improperly "reinforc[ing] stereo-
types about men and women."21
The constitutional question is difficult: although the Supreme Court
has held it unconstitutional for the government to enforce sex stereo-
types through legislation that creates different rights and duties for men
and women (including different rights and duties for husbands and
wives), it is not obvious that government expression and government
subsidy reflecting sexist views are similarly prohibited.22 As many writers
have noted, the Court's views on government speech and subsidy of
speech are scanty and inconsistent, leaving little guidance.23 However, on
the whole, the Court has tended to uphold selective government funding
that subsidizes some views but not others.24 At the same time, these
cases dealt mostly with content discrimination,25 and one sympathetic
with McClain's position might argue that a more stringent standard
would apply where the subsidy deals with matters of sex (or race) dis-
crimination.
20. Id. at 60-61.
21. Id. at 149 (footnote omitted): see also id. at 151. In support of this view, McClain cites Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), and Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women's Equality,
90 CAL. L. REV. 765 (2002). MCCLAIN. supra note 1, at 336 n.166.
22. McClain writes: "government may not promote [David] Popenoe's gendered division of la-
bor as a model of 'healthy marriage,' for that is tantamount to using law (as government once did) to
enforce a gendered allocation of responsibilities that reinforces stereotypes about men and women."
MCCLAIN, supra note 1. at 149. As discussed in the text, precedent in this area, at the least, strongly
questions an easy ("tantamount to") equation of gender-based legal categories and government advo-
cacy of gender hierarchy.
23. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 151-52 (1996); Martin H. Redish
& Daryl I. Kessler. Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 544 (1996); see
also LARRY ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 89-91 (2005): DANIEL A.
FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 208-10 (2d ed. 2003).
24. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. 524 U.S. 569. 587-88 (1998) (upholding
NEA funding decisions to discriminate on the basis of content): Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178
(1991) (upholding government family-planning funding limited to organizations that did not discuss
abortion as an option). In subsequent cases, the Court has come out the other way on occasion by
distinguishing Rust. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (invalidating
federal appropriations law barring LSC funding of organizations that challenged existing welfare law):
Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995) (holding unconstitutional a state university
program that excluded religious organizations from the category of student groups whose printing
costs would be subsidized). In these cases, the Court reaffirmed the right to subsidize viewpoints se-
lectively when the government itself is the speaker or when it uses private speakers to promote the
government's views. Legal Servs., 531 U.S. at 541: Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
25. See, e.g., Finley, 524 U.S. at 586-88 (upholding NEA funding decisions, noting that the gov-
ernment would not be allowed to use subsidies to suppress dangerous ideas, and explaining that the
test would be whether the funding decision had a coercive effect).
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McClain does not give great emphasis to the constitutional argu-
ment,2 6 so perhaps neither should this review. There remains the ques-
tion of policy. In very rough terms, McClain's argument is that it would
be a good thing to encourage equality within marriages.27  Even here,
some conservative social scientists have raised doubts. In a study that
was published after McClain's book came out, W. Bradford Wilcox and
Steven L. Nock concluded that women in "traditional" (non-egalitarian)
marriages were happier and more emotionally satisfied than those in
egalitarian marriages?
In a response (co-written with Joanna Grossman), McClain reads
the Wilcox and Nock study as being about expectations: women with low
expectations of spousal contributions often had their expectations ex-
ceeded, whereas those with high expectations were often disappointed
and frequently created a hostile or defensive reaction in their husbands.2 9
Under this reasonable reading of the study, McClain does not see the
data as grounds for refusing to encourage equality within marriage."
III. ABORTION
McClain's defense of the right to abortion is consistent with the
book's rubric of individual and family self-government and the govern-
ment's role in facilitating those objectives: "[a] fundamental component
of fostering responsibility and respecting personal self-government with
regard to family life is protecting the freedom to decide whether or not to
exercise one's capacity to reproduce."31 When considering the communi-
tarian argument that abortion involves women refusing to help the help-
less unborn children they are carrying, McClain responds with the equal-
ity argument that in a society that generally does not impose "Good
Samaritan" obligations,32 it is sexist to single out pregnant women to
carry that obligation, and it effectively denies such women "personal self-
26. It appears twice, in single-sentence references each time. See MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 149,
151.
27. Id. at 151-54.
28. W. Bradford Wilcox & Steven L. Nock, What's Love Got to Do With It? Equality, Equity,
Commitment and Women's Marital Quality, 84 Soc. FORCES 1321, 1340 (2006).
29. Joanna Grossman & Linda McClain, "Desperate Feminist Wives": Does the Quest for Marital
Equality Doom Marital Happiness?, FINDLAW, Apr. 4, 2006, http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/
commentary/20060404_mcclain.html.
30. See id.
31. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 223.
32. Similarly, Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument on abortion compared women who were preg-
nant without fault or intention (e.g., victims of rape) to being medically hooked up against one's will to
save the life of a dying violinist. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
47, 48-50 (1971), cited in MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 227, 348 n.12. The moral question alters at least
somewhat when the woman bears a greater level of responsibility for having become pregnant, though
it is still the case that carrying a pregnancy to term involves bearing a significant burden for the benefit
of another.
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government.'' For McClain, the right to abortion fosters responsibility,
not in the sense of "responsibility" that means acting according to so-
cially prescribed duties, but rather in the sense of the opportunity and
necessity of making basic life choices for oneself.34 In particular, women
facing unwanted pregnancies must evaluate their circumstances and their
relationships and obligations towards others, in determining whether
they are "capable of, or ready to assume the responsibility for, nurturing
a fetus and, ultimately, mothering a child."3s
These are important points to offer and a corrective to those who
accept a negative stereotype of most abortions as being done on "a
whim" or for "aesthetic reasons."36  At the same time, even if those
points are taken seriously, I suspect that committed opponents of abor-
tion would not be persuaded or appeased. These are, after all, on the
whole, reasons for not raising a child, not reasons for refusing to carry a
child to term. The opponents would point out that, given the current
supply and demand for children for adoption, there is every reason to be-
lieve that a baby given up immediately after birth would have no trouble
finding a loving home.37 That leaves the view (likely unpersuasive to
abortion opponents) that a woman's autonomy in decisions regarding
33. MCCLAIN. supra note 1, at 228. This is basically an equality argument. and like similar
equality arguments, it "risks" the response that equalizing actions can go in either of two directions.
The assumed prescription of the argument that women forced to carry pregnancies to term would have
altruistic burdens for which men carry no comparable burdens, is that women should not be forced to
carry pregnancies to term. However, one could argue the other way: that women should have to carry
pregnancies to term, but that something roughly comparable should be imposed on men. In his (un-
published) 1997 DeVane Lectures at Yale University. Judge Guido Calabresi suggested that men
might be placed in a lottery, such that a certain percentage of them would have to donate kidneys for
others. Guido Calabresi, Life, Death, and the Law. Lecture at the Yale University DeVane Lecture
Series (1997).
34. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 226-29.
35. Id. at 230.
36. The Guttmacher Institute reports: "On average, women give four reasons for choosing abor-
tion. Three-fourths of women cite concern for or responsibility to other individuals: three-fourths say
they cannot afford a child: three-fourths say that having a baby would interfere with work. school or
the ability to care for dependents: and half say they do not want to be a single parent or are having
problems with their husband or partner." GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN
THE UNITED STATES I (2006) (footnote omitted), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-
induced abortion.pdf.
37. An article from 1991 cited a figure of one million U.S. couples looking to adopt and only
about 33,000 infants available domestically for adoption. Lisa Gubernick, How Much Is That Baby in
the Window?, FORBES, Oct. 14, 1991, at 90. There is little reason to believe that the domestic supply or
demand has altered significantly since that date. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Admin.
for Children & Families, Trends in Foster Care and Adoption-FY 2000-FY 2005, http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/trendshtm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (showing that around
50,000 adoption were completed annually during fiscal years 2000-20(15): cf. Child Welfare Info.
Gateway, Persons Seeking to Adopt: Numbers and Trends (2005), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/
s-seek.cfm (showing that, according to a 1995 survey, "there were nearly 10 million ever-married
American women ages 18 to 44 who had ever considered adoption, and this number amounted to
more than one-fourth (26.4 percent) of all ever-married women." but less than 500,000 had completed
an adoption). However, foreign adoptions have increased to well over 20,000 each year. See Lynette
Clemetson & Ron Nixon, Breaking Through Adoption's Racial Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006. at
Al (presenting a graphic showing numbers of international adoptions, 1990-2005).
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whether to nurture the fetus is more important than the life of the fetus,
as well as the equality argument that forcing women to carry pregnancies
to term is an extraordinary burden-involving pain, discomfort, signifi-
cant interruption to life and career, and so on-and a burden that is im-
posed only on women.
IV. MARRIAGE: ABOLITION, EXTENSION, OR STATUS QUO?
Martha Fineman has for some time argued that civil marriage
should be abolished.38 A variety of commentators have since taken up
this suggestion. 9 Fineman argues that the state should not subsidize
some forms of sexual/romantic intimacy and not others, and that mar-
riage tends to privatize (and feminize) the cost of dependency.4" In this
book, and elsewhere,41 McClain has opposed this view, arguing that mar-
riage plays an important role in creating "intimate, committed bonds be-
tween adults" and "fostering goods as well as interdependencies."42 She
doubts that comparable benefits could be created from Fineman's alter-
native of private contract, which, for example, would deny couples "the
expressive benefit of public recognition of-and validation of-their
commitment."43
As McClain sees advantages of marriage to individuals and to soci-
ety, and does not see homosexuality as immoral, it is not surprising that
she broadly supports extending marriage to same-sex couples.44 She ar-
gues that exclusion of same-sex couples involves "an unjust imposition of
governmental orthodoxy about gender roles and sexuality," while also
excluding them from "cultural resources" useful for their development.45
Civil union laws, domestic partnership laws, and enforceable private con-
tracts are seen as inadequate substitutes for marriage, valuable primarily
as stepping-stones towards the full protection of same-sex marriage.46
38. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226-33 (1995); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS 29, 29-31 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006) (arguing for
abolishing civil marriage); Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Taking Government Out of the Marriage
Business: Families Would Benefit, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS, supra, at 70, 71.
39. This includes the British theological think tank Ekklesia. Simon Barrow & Jonathan
Bartley, What Future for Marriage, EKKLESIA, June 17, 2006, http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/
article abolishmarriage.shtml; see also Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage, SLATE, July 2, 2003,
http://www.slate.com/id/2085127; Stephen B. Presser, Marriage and the Law: Time for a Divorce?,
CHRONICLES: MAG. AM. CULTURE, Mar. 2004, at 20, available at http://www.heartland.org/pdf/14855.
pdf.
40. See FINEMAN, supra note 38, at 226-33.
41. See, e.g., Mary Lyndon Shanley & Linda McClain, Should States Abolish Marriage?, LEGAL
AFF., May 16, 2005, http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub-m0505.msp.
42. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 193.
43. Id. at 217.
44. Id. at 155-90.
45. Id. at 170.
46. Id. at 182-90.
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V. PERSUASION, DATA, AND COMPROMISE
If one's purpose is to recommend legal reform, it is, of course, use-
ful to take into account the lay of the political landscape. Pundits dis-
agree on what is likely to happen in the 2008 national elections, but it
seems a fair bet that we are still a long way away from having a federal
government that would work actively to make marriage available to
same-sex couples. We may also be some time way from a federal gov-
ernment that would advocate strongly for egalitarian marriage.
In order to discuss what government should do in regards to fami-
lies, one needs to have some notion of how to persuade the not-already-
persuaded. Persuasion is a topic onto itself, in which I claim no particu-
lar expertise, but there are a few things worth noting. First, there are ob-
vious difficulties where the people one is trying to persuade do not share
one's starting point, or one's foundational normative beliefs and com-
mitments.4" There is a lot of that going around: between people of dif-
ferent religious faiths (accepting different religious texts or different in-
terpretations of those texts as authoritative) or even between
consequentialists48 and deontologists.49
One possible basis for persuasion in such cases is to find some point
of agreement.") McClain gives just such an example in her book: how
people with quite a different view on teenage sexuality (and sexuality
generally) might agree that it would be a good thing if the number of
unwanted pregnancies and abortions among teenagers declined." One
should then consider the empirical data regarding which strategy has
proven most successful in reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies
and abortions. However, McClain effectively shows how public policy
discussions about sex education have allowed rhetoric to overcome em-
pirical evidence. If reducing teenage pregnancy and teenage sexual ac-
tivity is our objective, "abstinence plus" programs have been shown to be
47. If one accepts the conventional philosophical view that one cannot derive a normative
("ought") conclusion from purely factual ("is") premises, then any normative claim (about what ought
to be done) assumes a normative premise, and that premise its own normative premise, and so on, un-
til one comes to a foundational normative axiom (perhaps "act to maximize social welfare" or "do
what God commands") for which, by definition (as a foundational axiom), no further direct proof can
be offered. On the is/ought distinction, see, for example. Warren J. Samuels, You Cannot Derive
"Ought"from "Is," 83 ETHICS 159 (1973).
48. "Consequentialism" is the "view that the value of an action derives entirely from the value of
its consequences. This contrasts both with the view that the value of an action may derive from the
value of the kind of character whose action it is .. .. and with the view that its value may be intrin-
sic...." SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 77 (1994).
49. "Deontology" or "deontological ethics" is an "[e]thics based on the notion of a duty, or what
is right, or rights, as opposed to ethical systems based on the idea of achieving some good state of af-
fairs ... or the qualities of character necessary to live well .... The leading deontological system is that
of Kant." BLACKBURN, supra note 48, at 100.
50. John Rawls thought that there were so many points of agreement among major theories of
the good that a modern society might construct theories of justice -structures of society-from that
"overlapping consensus." JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
51. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 259-63.
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more effective than "abstinence only" programs.12 Yet there is little indi-
cation that such evidence has nudged social conservatives from their
support of "abstinence only."53
An alternative (and perhaps related) strategy to persuasion when
there is no shared normative foundation is to speak in broadly utilitar-
ian54 or consequentialist 5 terms. That is, one speaks to advantages in
happiness, general welfare, basic goods, or some other matters in which
there is an assumed consensus that these are things Worth pursuing and
increasing. Policy arguments in family law, as in most other areas, tend
to be grounded in a kind of unarticulated, general consequentialism-an
assumption that we should choose those rules and principles that are
most likely to maximize the welfare, happiness, or well-being of the
greatest number.
One persistent problem of this approach is that we rarely have data
adequate enough to make conclusions on these matters. The above ex-
ample of data on the effects of alternative approaches to sex education is
the exception rather than the rule. For most policy questions, there is no
significant social science data at all. Moreover, for the few areas where
there is data, the studies tend to be both doubtful and in sharp disagree-
ment.
For example, regarding same-sex marriage, much of the debate has
been about the effect on children of having same-sex parents. The first
thing to note is the awkward fit of such data to the conclusions it is being
used to support. 6 The question is who should marry, not who should be
allowed to parent. We no longer (openly at least) take away children
52. Id. at 256-65. It should be noted, though, that conclusions regarding the effects of (different
forms of) sex education remain controversial. One expert in the area recently concluded that sex edu-
cation has not been proven to have significant effects (either positive or negative). See KRISTIN
LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL 243-59 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Samuel G. Freedman, Muzzling Sex Education on Anything but Abstinence, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2006, at B7 (describing the political blocking of sex education legislation that goes be-
yond "abstinence only" in New York, Illinois, and Minnesota).
54. "Utilitarianism" is an "ethical theory ... that answers all questions of what to do, what to
admire, or how to live, in terms of maximizing utility or happiness. As well as an ethical theory, utili-
tarianism is, in effect, the view of life presupposed in most modern political and economic planning,
when it is supposed that happiness is measured in economic terms." BLACKBURN, supra note 48, at
388.
55. See supra note 48.
56. This has not prevented courts from focusing on parenting when considering the constitution-
ality of excluding same-sex couples from marriage. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1. 7
(N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982-83 (Wash. 2006). In defense of these courts,
they were asking the highly deferential question of whether distinguishing in legal treatment between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples could be rational, and it may not be entirely insane, even if not in
the end wise, to regulate couples differently with attention to perceived differences in parenting abil-
ity. However, on its own terms, as other commentators have pointed out, the connection is neither
obvious nor strong. See, e.g., Dan Savage, Op-Ed., Same-Sex Marriage Wins by Losing, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2006, at 13 (criticizing the reasoning of the Washington and New York courts).
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from their parents just because the parents are homosexual. 7 Further-
more, not being married has not stopped many same-sex couples (and a
vastly larger number of heterosexual couples) from having and raising
children." It is, of course, more than possible that the number of same-
sex couples raising children is reduced somewhat by refusing such cou-
ples the option to marry, along with other legal barriers, like refusing
second-parent adoption and refusing to enforce co-parenting agree-
ments, barriers that create uncertainty in the legal relationship of one or
both partners to children they might raise. Still, there is certainly no data
on the effect of those legal barriers (let alone some way of "balancing"
the purported benefits of that prevention against the unmeasured, but
real harm to children who are being raised by same-sex parents without
lasting legal bonds to both parents).
Even if this were the right question to focus on, the data at this
point appears to be both too scarce and too controversial for grounding a
confident conclusion. 9 The main problem appears to be that social sci-
entists are coming relatively late to the study of children of same-sex cou-
ples. Thus there has not been a sufficient quantity-or an adequately
scientific selection among the sample-and the studies have not been
able to track effects well over the long term.'"
The proper question should be the effect of same-sex marriages on
marriage as an institution generally. Opponents of same-sex marriage
claim that it will undermine the institution, but their claim is usually
about long-term effects-effects that, should they occur, probably would
be hard to discern at this early stage in Massachusetts (the one state that
currently allows same-sex marriage).61 Even over time, it may be hard to
57. See, e.g., IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 579 (4th ed.
2004) ("The judicial trend is to require that homosexual behavior, like heterosexual behavior, be
shown to be harmful before a court may take it into account.").
58. Based on the 2000 Census data, it is estimated that same-sex couples are raising more than
two hundred and fifty thousand children under the age of eighteen. R. BRADLEY SEARS, GARY
GATES & WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND SAME-SEX COUPLES RAISING CHIL-
DREN IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM CENSUS 2000 (2005), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/
williamsinstitute/publications/USReport.pdf. However, that is only a small fraction of the number of
children being raised outside of marriage. Focusing on only nonmarital births, in 1999. over 1.3 million
children were born out of wedlock. U.S. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, TABLE 1-17: NUMBER
AND PERCENT OF BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED WOMEN, BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: UNITED
STATES, 1940-99 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t99lx17.pdf.
59. Compare William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and
America's Children, 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Fall 2005, at 97, 102-03, available at http://www.
futureofchildren.org/usr-doc/06 -FOC15-2_fa1105Meezan-Rauch.pdf (arguing that the data support
conclusions that children of same-sex couples are doing well), with MAGGIE GALLAGHER & JOSHUA
K. BAKER, INST. FOR MARRIAGE & PUB. POL'Y, DO MOTHERS AND FATHERS MATTER? THE SOCIAL
SCIENCE EVIDENCE ON MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELL-BEING 1 (2004), available at http://www.
marriagedebate.com/pdf/MothersFathersMatter.pdf (arguing that social science data support the clear
superiority of children raised by opposite-sex parents).
60. See sources cited supra note 59 (making reference to these problems).
61. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the
Massachusetts Constitution requires extension of marriage to same-sex couples).
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disentangle same-sex marriage from the myriad social and cultural fac-
tors impinging on the experience and perception of marriage.62
At this point, opponents of same-sex marriage might accept that the
social science data is uncertain. They may also accept that same-sex cou-
ples (along with single parents, and other "suboptimal parents") will con-
tinue to have and to raise children, but that all of this is beside the point.
These opponents will say that the reason why they are against same-sex
marriage, without regard to the long-term effects on children and (at
least for some) with no opposition to a comparable "civil unions" op-
tion, 63 is that it is all about the message expressed by state law. 6 Like the
laws prohibiting adultery that stay "on the books" despite little or no le-
gal enforcement (and no public pressure for enforcement), laws exclud-
ing same-sex couples from marriage can be seen as expressing a public
sentiment (regarding marriage, same-sex relationships, or both), regard-
less of their real-world consequences. One would obviously need a dif-
ferent, nonconsequentialist, line of argument to persuade those seeking
only to "express" a certain "message."
Returning to the topic of consequentialism and the scarcity of data:
even if one were unhappy about the terms of debate in these areas, the
problem is that there are few good alternatives to deciding on the basis
of consequences (even if the consequences on which we base our deci-
sions are nothing more than our own unschooled armchair speculations).
Outside of consequentialism, one tends to be left only with appeals to
foundational values or religious views that are themselves highly contro-
versial. The current debates about marriage may be good examples both
of the weak grounding of consequentialist arguments and the disadvan-
tages of any alternative discourse.
One can see the potential impasse also in the area of sex education.
One theorist discusses why evaluation of empirical effects (or other con-
62. For a debate about whether anything can be learned about the effects of same-sex marriage
from the experience of various Scandinavian countries (who have had marriage or marriage-like rela-
tionships open to same-sex couples for some years), see Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scan-
dinavia, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, at 26 (arguing that the Scandinavian experience shows the
deleterious effects of same-sex marriage); William N. Eskridge et al., Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Reg-
istered Partnerships and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 5 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP art. 4
(2004), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art4/ (critiquing Kurtz's views); Stanley Kurtz, No Nordic Bliss,
NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2006, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/
kurtz200602280810.asp (responding to Eskridge et al.).
63. See, e.g., Civil Unions for Gays Favored, Polls Show, MSNBC.com, Mar. 12, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4496265/ (summarizing an opinion poll that found gay marriage op-
posed by 59% of Americans, but that 54% favored civil unions).
64. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) (defending expressive theories of law).
65. A different sort of "expression" occurred when 40% of the Alabama voters in 2000 opposed
a referendum to remove the prohibition of interracial marriages in the state constitution. See State of
Alabama 2000 Election Information, http://www.sos.state.al.us/election/2000/2000.htm. It was a con-
stitutional provision that had already been rendered void by the Supreme Court decision in Loving v.
Virginia. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). People want their marriage laws to "make statements," and these
statements are not always morally worthy ones.
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sequences), discussed earlier in this Part, may not be enough to bring dif-
ferent sides to compromise:
[One side] hold[s] that sex is natural and unmysterious, a healthy
pleasurable, quasi-recreational activity. [The other side] consider[s]
sex sacred but dangerous, transformative when contained by mar-
riage but destructive outside it. Sex education, [to the first side], in-
volves nothing more than helping young people manage the risks of
having sex by giving them the facts. It's information, not values.
[To the other side], conventional sex education is chock-full of val-
ues, but all the wrong ones."
The same commentator speculates that our different "expressions" about
sex education in fact hide different "expressions" about marriage67 -or,
perhaps, about the good life generally.
Although persuasion is a central concern in social reform, it is nei-
ther sufficient nor necessary for effecting change. It is not sufficient be-
cause a large majority can be in favor of something, but if that majority is
not well organized or is only weakly committed, well-entrenched or well-
financed interests can easily block change.68 Persuasion is also not neces-
sary, in the sense that a minority can get its interests served if it can find a
common cause with others, through the usual tools of politics-horse
trading and compromise.
Some of the issues McClain discusses seem well suited for compro-
mise. As already noted, conservatives and liberals might be able to find
common ground in sex education programs that are proven to reduce
premarital sex and abortions.69 Also, many opponents of same-sex mar-
riage seem willing to accept comparable protections for same-sex couples
as long as the institution carries a different name (e.g., "civil union" or
"domestic partnership").7"
Supporters of same-sex marriage sometimes have mixed feelings
about civil unions and similar institutions, viewing them as granting
same-sex couples "second-class status."71 Further, one can understand
proponents for gay rights responding the same way the Civil Rights lead-
ers did when that movement's leaders were cautioned for patience and
66. Judith Shulevitz, Teach Your Children Well, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, Sunday Book Re-
view, at 8 (summarizing LUKER, supra note 52).
67. See id. at 9.
68. Some would say that this has been the case for gun control and healthcare reform and within
family law recently, divorce reform in New York. See Editorial, The Long Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26. 2006, at 13 (discussing proposals for reforming New York divorce law and the resistance they have
met).
69. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Editorial, What's So Scary About Love?, HARTFORD COURANT. July 20, 2006, at
A8 (describing the difference between recognizing same-sex marriage and a civil union law as "the
difference between legitimate recognition and second-class citizenship"). McClain largely adopts this
criticism. MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 182-89.
No. 311 1067
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
moderation in the face of grave injustice.72 At the same time, the normal
progress of politics is that of half measures, and there are pragmatic rea-
sons for favoring compromise over principle. 3
CONCLUSION
There are few things harder than writing effective normative schol-
arship: one needs to find the right answer to difficult social problems, jus-
tify one's conclusions, persuade those who are initially in disagreement
or simply suspicious, and then galvanize sufficient support for change to
happen. It is vastly easier to sit on the sidelines and comment about
what needs to be done than actually to do those things. The Place of
Families is a great achievement, and if there is still work to be done by
way of persuasion and mobilization, that is only the faintest of criticisms.
72. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, Apr. 16, 1963, available at
http://stanford.edu/group/king/frequentdocs/birmingham.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Are Civil Unions a Dead End?, INDEP. GAY FORUM, http://www.
indegayforum.org/news/printer/26686.html (reprinting a column from the Feb. 17, 2005 Bay Area Re-
porter, making a similar point about civil unions and compromise).
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